26155
Sharp, Granville, 1735-1813.
Letter from Granville Sharp.
Baltimore, Graham, Yundt & Patton, 1793. 11 pp.
NYPL copy.
LETTER
FROM
GRANVILLE SHARP, ESQ.
OF
LONDON,
TO THE
MARYLAND SOCIETY
FOR PROMOTING THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY,
AND THE
RELIEF OF FREE NEGROES AND OTHERS, UNLAWFULLY
HELD IN BONDAGE.

PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE SOCIETY.

BALTIMORE:
Printed by D. GRAHAM, L. YUNDT, and W. PATTON, in CALVERT-
Street, near the Court-House.
M.DCC.XCIII.
ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following pages contain the Postscript of a Letter written by GRANVILLE SHARP, Esquire, of London, to the Secretary of the Maryland Society for promoting the Abolition of Slavery, &c.

The author has calculated his observations, principally, for the present actual state of the British Colonies, where slavery is tolerated by law. They were once more applicable to the condition of these States, and it is matter of deep and serious regret, that their pertinency in any degree continues. But the glorious American revolution, which gave to people of one complexion independence and liberty, unhappily left those of another to groan under the weight of the most cruel and remorseless slavery. The mind that can exercise unprejudiced reason, and all who regard the Will of Heaven, will abhor the absurd discrimination. Still slavery exists, and, in the case of slaves escaping from their masters, the friends of universal liberty are often embarrass'd in their conduct, by a conflict between their principles and the obligations imposed by unwife, and perhaps unconstitutional, laws. Sensible of the delicacy of their situation and the difficulties they have to struggle with, the Maryland Society have been extremely circumspect in their conduct, and have endeavoured to avoid alarming the slave-holder, or interfering in any manner with the laws of property. The production, however, of a great and respectable name, founded in reason and revealed religion, and on a subject daily brought into view by interesting occurrences in the Southern States, cannot offend the enlightened citizens of a free country. Many will collect from his learning and deep researches, much useful information, and all will find ample matter for serious contemplation.
A REMARK which I wrote many years ago, respecting the illegality of taking up "slaves that had escaped from their masters," had been useful (I was informed) to some friends of humanity in America, in their endeavours to protect those poor oppressed people. I cannot now find a copy of that paper, but the argument was chiefly built on a reference to a text in Deut. xxiii. 15, 16.—"Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in the place which he shall choose," (manifestly as a freeman) "in one of thy gates where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him." This, I observed, was no part of the abrogate ceremonial law of the Jews; but manifestly a moral law, because the reason of it still remains, so that it must be of indispensable obligation as long as the hateful oppressions of slave-holders afford us any occasions of exercising this duty to God of protecting the slaves that escape from their masters; and, consequently, I asserted, that any colonial law, which opposes this ordinance of God, by ordering the arresting, and delivering up runaway slaves; or which, in any way, tends to deprive them of due legal protection, is, of course, to be deemed "a corruption, null and void in itself," as being contrary to the second foundation of English law. This necessary consequence I urged from a well known maxim of the English law respecting statutes (acts of assembly, or acts of parliament) "nec contra rationem, nec contra legem divinam" (statuta) "existunt."—(Doct. et Stud. e. 10.)—That "statutes exist not against reason, nor against the divine
divine law." And that "an unjust law is not law."—
"Lex injusta non est lex." (Prin. Leg. et Äquit.)—And
again, that "these two laws," (viz. the law of reason, and
the law divine) "cannot abate, or turn aside."—"Hæ
duæ leges declinari non possunt."—(Doct. et Stud. c. 17.)

But I have since had occasion to regard these two funda-
damental laws of the English constitution with still more
awful attention; and therefore I must farther remark, that
the first foundation, the law of reason (as including all the
laws of nature, justice and natural right) is certainly to be
deemed "the law of God," as well as the second foun-
dation, the divine precepts in the holy scriptures; because
the former is defined by high legal authority, to be "the
"law written upon the heart of man," (and of course is
the law of the Creator) which "cannot therefore be ob-
"literated, nor changed, by time or place, but ought,
"every where, and among all men, to be maintained,
"because the laws of nature are immutible"—"Lex ra-
"tionis in corde scribitur," (which must therefore be at-
tributed to the Creator) "ideo deleri non potest, nec
"recipient mutationem, ex loco nec tempore, sed ubique
"et inter omnes homines servari debet; nam jura natu-
"ralia immutabilia sunt." (Doct. et Stud. c. 2. p. 5.)
This amply demonstrates the propriety of declaring the
law of reason to be the first foundation of English law, as
being "the law of God, written (as it were) on the heart
"of man."—It is that "knowledge of good and evil in
"man" which may fairly be deemed a participation of
the "divine wisdom," or of Christ himself, that "true
"light which lighteth every man that cometh into the
"world," (John i. 9.) and of course it renders every
man obnoxious, through the knowledge of right and law,
to the divine vengeance for disobedience! Our first pa-
rents wilfully assumed this knowledge, contrary to an ex-
press command of their Creator, (being deluded by the
spiritual enemy) and thereby entailed death and condem-
nation on all their posterity, laying them under an abso-
lute
lute necessity to obtain redemption by a still farther participation of the same “divine wisdom,” or “word of God.”

There is also another legal term or title for this first foundation of law, viz. “the eternal law,” which in our books is properly defined to mean exactly the same authority as the “law of reason,” i.e. “The supreme reason of divine wisdom, by which God wills that all things created by him, be moved and directed to a good and proper end.”—Lex ætærna nihil aliud est quam ipse summa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo, five illa summa ratio divinae sapientiae, qua vult Deus omnia secon-dita moveri et dirigi, ad bonum et debitum finem,” &c. (Doct. et Stud. c. 1. p. 2.) And again:—The “law eternal under another description is called a perpetual and constant will to give to every one his right.” “Lex ætærna sub alia descriptione dicitur perpetua et constans voluntas jus suum unicuique tribuens;” (ibid.) Here, then, we find an unmoveable foundation of justice, of right, of “the rights of man,” of “righteousness,” of “the law of nature,” &c. for all these terms are parallel, and are necessarily included in the law of reason, or eternal law, which is, very properly, therefore, called “the first law.”—“Lex etiam ætæna dicitur lex prima, et bene dicitur prima, nam fuit ante omnes alias leges: et omnes aliae leges dirivantur ab ea.”—“The law eternal is called the first law, and well it is called the first, for it was before all other laws: and all other laws are derived from it.” In this solemn view of the first foundation of English law, it must evidently be deemed “a witness of God,” as well as the second foundation, the written word of God in the holy scriptures: and both foundations may well be expressed together by the more compendious terms of “natural and revealed religion.”

In no instance whatever are these “two witnesses of God” more obviously and undeniably refuted than in the toleration of slavery and the slave trade, because they are
are iniquities which militate against both foundations, and may therefore be fairly deemed an infallible touchstone to discover the treachery of pretended loyalists; for no man can be truly loyal to God and his country, who is so totally devoid of first principles, as to favour slavery! Let those, who have ignorantly done so, recover their credit by redoubled endeavours to restore the honour and constitutional law of their country, which has been wounded by their treacherous neglect of these foundations of law, whereby they will otherwise incur that indelible stain of infamy which our common law deservedly fixes on all persons who betray the law of the land. "Legem terræ amittentes perpetuam infamiam notam inde merito incurrunt." (3 Inst. p. 221.)

But mark the authorities of our common law to this purpose.—"Liberty" is declared by the maxims of the first foundation, to be inestimable." "Libertas est res inestimabilis," (Jenk. Cent. 52.) and "liberty is the greatest jewel." (Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity, p. 196.) And, therefore "cruel of necessity must that law be deemed which augmenteth slavery, and diminisheth liberty,"—(says the excellent and worthy chancellor Fortescu, who in very dark times of prevailing bestial power, nobly asserted the supreme immutable authority of God's two witnesses, as manifested in the first principles of our English common law, or legal constitution.) "For in behalf of liberty," (says he) "human nature always implores," (or solicits favour) "because slavery is introduced by man, and for vice; but liberty is implanted by God in the very nature of man; whereas when stolen by man, it always earnestly longs to return, as does every thing which is deprived of natura liberty. For which reason the man who does not favour liberty is to be adjudged impious and cruel." "The laws of England acknowledging these (principles) give favour
"favour to liberty in every case."—A part of this sentence is cited by Lord Coke as a maxim of our common law—"Impius et crudelis judicandum est qui libertati non favet," (Co. Lit. 124.) viz. "Impious and cruel is the man to be adjudged who does not favour liberty." The opposite condition, therefore, to liberty, viz. slavery, is properly declared by one of our oldest English authorities in law, Fleta, to be "contrary to nature," † (Fleta, 2d edit. p. 1.) which expression of Fleta is really a maxim of the civil or Roman law, (see Inslit. Lib. 1. tit. 3. leg. 2.) and tho' such appeals in the Roman code to the foundations of law could not restrain the belluina potestas of Roman tyranny in any of the ten kingdoms of the beast, as clearly foretold in the scriptures, nor prevent improper additions to the code, under the name of law, yet surely the friends of liberty may be thankful to the Justinian code for the authority or its testimony against slavery: for when the two first foundations of law shall hereafter be restored, through God's mercy, to their due power and effect—when thefe "two witnesses of God shall stand upon their feet, and ascend into heaven," i. e.—be established above all human authority, and be acknowledged as the irresistible will of God, which must "be done on earth as it is in heaven;" then shall our deluded statesmen, lawyers, commercial politicians, and planters, be compelled to understand that a more forcible expression of illegality and

* "Cruelis etiam necessario judicabitur lex, quæ servitutem augmentat, et minuit libertatem. Nam pro ea natura semper imploretur, rat humana. Quia ab homine et pro vicio introducTa est servitutem. Sed libertas a Deo hominis est in natura. Quare ipsa ab homine sublata semper redire glificet, ut facit omne quod liberate naturale privatnur. Quo impius et crudelis judicandum est qui libertatem t.d non favet. Hae considerantia anglic a jura in omnj causa libertatis dant favorem," (Chanc. Port. de Landibus Legum Angliae, c. 42. p. 101.)

† "Est quidem servitutis, libertati contrarium ipsum constitutum: quoddam de jure gentium qua quis dominio" (or rather "dominio") "alieno contra naturam subjicitur," &c. (Fleta, 2d edit. p. 1.)
and iniquity could not have been used than that by which slavery is defined in the Roman code, as well as by our English Fleta—i. e. that it is "contra naturam"—"against nature"—for consequently it must be utterly illegal, a crime which by the first foundation of English law is justly deemed both impious and cruel; and which, in the strong figurative language of God's prophets, under the second foundation of our law, is compared to the guilt of cannibalism (or eating human flesh) as I have shewed, in my remonstrance to the citizens of London * and therefore this unnatural crime of slavery, and the slave trade, must necessarily be deemed, like all other unnatural crimes, detestable, abominable, and damnable, both to the souls and bodies of all that wilfully promote them! The severity of these expressions cannot be restrained without injustice to the high authorities on which this argument is founded.

It would be an awful enquiry to trace the time when the English nation was rendered obnoxious, by slavery, to the application of these horrible epithets, impious, cruel, &c. and it is wonderful how the unnatural crime could so long be overlooked until us age and custom had established in all the British colonies, as a right, this enormous wrong, to the perversion of all legal terms, especially as the setting aside the foundations of law, is properly deemed, in the English constitution, an abdication of government ("non enim est rex ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex") "there is no king where will governs and not law," an allowed maxim of the English constitution, so long ago as the reign of king Henry II. (see Bracton and Fleta.) We cannot therefore suppose that the toleration of slavery in the colonies, (which, according to the constitutional principles of English government, must undermine the king's right to reign there, or in any other place, where by an illegal assent he has established

* See the parts marked with red ink, in the London edition of the said remonstrance, pages 8, 9, 10.
blished a fundamental corruption of the constitutional law; we cannot, I say, conceive) that the admission of slavery has been intentional on the part of government at home, but merely through want of a fixed attention to the two first principles of law and religion. But the sworn judges of the colonial courts are without excuse, for permitting the evil of slavery to take root, without warning their royal masters of the illegality, knowing that the kings are bound by the constitutiona' law of the kingdom "to deny justice to no man," without exception, ("nulli negabimus aut differemus juflitiam," Magna Charta;) and knowing that they themselves are sworn "to do justice and judgment, without respect of persons;"—and also, that under a legal English government there can be but one law for all descriptions of persons, according to two excellent maxims of the first foundations, * and consequently, that without national reproach, there could be no such personal distinctions in law, as slave-holder and slave, so that they must be bound in duty to their king and country to prevent, in the king's name, any such oppression as slave-holding. They ought to have known that the limited temporal permission which had been granted to the Israelites to hold slaves, was absolutely annulled by a subsequent command of God "to let the oppressed go free," and "to break every yoke," (Isaiah viii. 5, 6.) There is no exception to this command, which proves that a total abolition of slavery was at that time the declared will of God, which is still more clearly demonstrated by a future denunciation against the practice of slave-holders, by the prophet Jeremiah, just before the Israelites themselves were to be carried into slavery, for their oppressions and neglect of God's laws. "Woe be to him that useth his neighbour's service without wages, and giveth him not for his work."  

B These

* "Turpis et pars quæ non convenit cum suo toto"—and, nihil in lege "intolerabilius est eandem rem diverso jure centuri," (Ground and Rudiments of Law and Equity, No. 307.)
There are moral laws of eternal obligation, (though delivered by two prophets of the Old Testament) because the reason, justice and mercy of them are still obvious; for "the reason of the law is the life of the law." "Ratio legis est anima legis." And therefore surely "Woe is most alarmingly due to all governments, or pretend-ed legal establishments, which sanction such notorious injustice and oppression!"

For many years the kings of England have unwarily been induced by their ministers and privy council, for mere political reasons of finance or commerce, to sanction colonial laws which have been utterly inconsistent with the two first foundations of English law: but these two witnesses of God may now, in a more particular manner, be laid to be slain and lie dead before us (viz. a political or civil death) ever since the parliament itself, (after the most earnest solicitation and representation, by the people at large, of the enormous iniquity of the slave trade, for more than three years) have, at last, refused redress! Their examination of witnesses will afford them no excuse, because no other witnesses were necessary, in this peculiar case, than the two fundamental witnesses of the English law, which are so indispensable to constitute a legal government, that no man can be qualified to act as a legislator (nor even to exercise the election franchise) who does not acknowledge their supreme authority. It is a test which is now become obviously necessary!

After such a total disregard of the very foundations of the English constitution by the legislature, as may fairly be deemed a civil death of these two witnesses, we have not only to dread the infamy incurred, according to the maxim "Lægæm terræ amittentes," &c. but also to look for divine retribution from him who has promised "to destroy the destroyers of the earth," and "to lead into captivity those that led into captivity." And indeed after the most careful investigation of all the prophetic marks of the antichristian beast, and its image, compared with
with preceding times, according to the best chronological
histories, I am convinced that the accomplishment of the
tyranny (not by human means, but "without hand,")
must be nearly approaching! The divine vengeance seems
ready to be poured upon us!

Let not the inhabitants of Maryland and Carolina con-
ceive, that because their territories are not included with-
in the bounds of the four great monarchies, the theatre of
the prophetic examples of divine vengeance, they shall
be less liable to the awful effects of it! for, be assured, that
when the ten kingdoms of bestial Roman government are
destroyed, the will of God, as expressed in the two foun-
dations of English law, natural and revealed religion (God's
two witnesses) will certainly be established "on earth as it
"is in heaven," according to the universal prayer of the
Christian Church; nay it will be established "under the
"whole heaven," (Daniel vii. 27.) So that the only ef-
fectual means of avoiding this universal destruction of be-
tial illegality is, to acknowledge, reverence and establish
the two first foundations of English law above all other
authorities; for that must be the universal effect of the
kingdom of Christ on earth.

If the legislators and lawyers of Maryland and the Car-
rolinas shall be able to suggest any thing like an argu-
ment in opposition to the high legal authorities which I have
cited, they must have more subtile heads, and worse hearts,
than I am willing to attribute to any one, who is not ob-
viously actuated by the grand spiritual enemy of man!

GRANVILLE SHARP,

Garden-Court, Temple, London.

F I N I S.